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Abstract
The experience of European Union (EU) health care services policy shows the importance of
supporting coalitions in any effort to effect policy change and the extent to which the presence or
absence of such coalitions can qualify generalizations about policymaking. EU health care services
law is substantively liberalizing and procedurally driven by the courts, with little legislative input.
But the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been much better at establishing an EU competency
in law than in causing policy development in the EU or member states. Literature on courts helps
to explain why: courts are most effective when they enjoy supporting coalitions and the ECJ does
not have a significant supporting coalition for its liberalizing health care services policy. Based on
interview data, this article argues that the hard law of health care services deregulation and the
newer forms of health care governance, such as the Open Method of Coordination and the
networks on rare diseases, depend on supporting coalitions in member states that are willing to
litigate, lobby, budget, decide cases, and otherwise implement EU law and policy. Given the resis-
tance that the Court has met in health care sectors, its overarching deregulatory approach might
produce smaller effects than expected, and forms of experimentalist governance that are easy to
deride might turn out to have supporting coalitions that make them unexpectedly effective.
Keywords: European Union, experimentalist governance, courts, OMC, health care, health
policy.
1. Introduction
There is a fundamental constitutional asymmetry in the European Union (EU) (Scharpf
2002). Put simply, EU institutions are more effective and powerful at liberalizing, market-
making activities than they are at developing positive legislation (Streeck & Schmitter
1991; Leibfried & Pierson 1995; Ferrera 2005).
The substance of EU law is asymmetrical. The treaties that constitute the EU create
strong legal grounds for court decisions and legislation to create integrated European
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markets. The “four freedoms” – the freedom of movement within the EU of goods,
services, capital, and people – are powerful principles in EU law. They justify removing
member state policies that interfere with the internal market and the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) typically allows only narrow exceptions to them. The EU budget, mean-
while, is small – capped at just over 1% of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) – and
is a fraction of the kind of money member states spend on welfare.
The procedures of EU policymaking are also asymmetrical. The EU’s legislative
process is complex and filled with veto points. Passing legislation through such a process
is slow and uncertain, while introducing legislation is a right confined to the executive
(the European Commission). Neither the directly elected European Parliament nor the
Council, where states vote, has the ability to introduce legislation. They can only amend.
By contrast, the EU’s judicial branch and executive are less rigid. The ECJ can receive cases
from courts across the EU and make decisions whose consequences can in most cases be
modified by only the slow EU legislative route. The Commission has considerable dis-
cretionary and agenda-setting autonomy, including the right to bring enforcement cases
against states that do not implement EU law.
In this account, the EU is a powerful engine for liberalization but is not as good at
making counteracting laws that harmonize minimum standards, creating compensating
welfare programs, or protecting country-specific institutions that enhance welfare but
conflict with ECJ rulings. This explains why the EU has been such a success at market
making – and why there is no EU welfare state (Kleinman 2002; Moravcsik 2002; Ferrera
2005; Anderson 2009; Newdick 2009). It also explains why there has been such scholarly
and practical interest in “experimentalist governance” (Sabel & Zeitlin 2010) – mecha-
nisms that would create EU-level social policy despite the limitations of the Treaties and
the difficulties of the legislative process. Experimentalist governance mechanisms are an
effort to introduce concepts that are not in the treaties – such as a commitment to quality,
solidaristic, and financially sustainable health care – and mechanisms that will promote
those objectives without going through the difficult legislative process.
I argue that the constitutional asymmetry of the EU is overdrawn. The legislative
process, executive politics, and ECJ all have built-in biases toward negative integration
and market making. But those apparently strong policies are still subject to multiple
forms of implementation failure and can lose political momentum if opponents out-
number supporters. On the other hand, apparently weak, voluntary initiatives based on
benchmarking, data collection, and networks might be stronger than they first appear.
What they lack in the authority of law they might make up in supporters eager to
implement them on the ground and further them in EU political debates.
The second section of the article presents this case. It argues that the common
denominator of effective policies, established or experimental, is a supporting coalition –
of litigants who will file cases against non-compliance with EU law, of lobbyists who will
press for the necessary legislative and policy changes, of courts that will enforce and refer
cases filed under the new jurisprudence, of technical and legal experts who can give
specificity to broad goals, of bureaucratic elites who oversee policy drafting and imple-
mentation, and of ministers who are willing to legislate and budget for policy change.
Without a supporting coalition, there is a short-run likelihood that decisions will have
little or no compliance and a medium-run likelihood that the EU institutions, lacking a
supporting coalition, will tire of failure and reduce their efforts at policymaking in the
policy area.
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The third section reviews the “hard law” that created the EU’s new competencies in
health care services policy. The ECJ showed its power and autonomy vis-à-vis states and
interest groups by extending internal market law to health care services despite the lack of
support for such an agenda. The Commission, member states, and Parliament started to
develop policy in order to create legal certainty lacking in case by case legal development
and corral the developing policy into a legislative arena that they controlled. But partici-
pants in the legislative process for health care services have had the general problem of the
EU: difficulty finding treaty bases for positive heath care rights and difficulty constructing
the coalitions that would pass them. The story told in the section shows both the extent
of constitutional asymmetry – in the unbidden creation of a liberalizing EU competency
– and the difficulty of legislating less-liberalizing policy. But the history of the political
debates and the developing evidence on EU health care services policy impact also
show the limited nature of the support coalition behind liberalization and the strong
resistance.
The fourth section reviews some of the experimentalist governance. First, it discusses
a benchmarking exercise called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), widely her-
alded as the most effective EU-level mechanism for raising levels of welfare provision and
promoting positive integration. Then it turns to sectoral programs such as the network
on rare disease and the networks on communicable disease control. The OMC is a
mechanism for considering and possibly changing entire welfare states, and is easy to tar
as vague and macroscopic. The rare diseases network and others such as cancer research
are mechanisms for considering and possibly changing a tightly defined area of health
care services. The comparison of law and experimentalist governance mechanisms high-
lights the importance of supporting coalitions: the OMC, like the Court, lacks an obvious
supporting coalition, but more focused networks can gain such coalition support.
The fifth section, the conclusion, argues that mechanisms of experimentalist gover-
nance that develop networks and harmonize standards in very specific areas such as the
treatment of rare diseases might be as effective at policy change in their areas as law or
possibly the OMC. That is because they, unlike the bulk of EU initiatives under internal
market law, can have clear uses for incumbents within health policy communities. And in
the longer run, the weaknesses of judicially driven liberalization might emerge. The grand
designs of EU law might be stalemated by political and bureaucratic resistance, while the
more specific plans of specific networks might find receptive hosts in the EU.
This article relies on two major data sources. These interviews allowed me to interpret
data from the second source: a review of 124 interviews conducted since 2004 in Brussels
(EU institutions and lobbies) and four member states (France, Germany, Spain, and the
UK), supplemented by short re-interviews and observation of EU events in Brussels,
Gastein, and London. The interviews included at least two Commission desk officers for
each policy area discussed; member state desk officers (at least one each in the health
ministry and permanent representation in Brussels); regional government officials
involved in implementing EU policy for at least four regional governments each in
Germany, Spain, and the UK; and the Brussels lobbies of the principal EU health care
lobbies as well as regional government and member state health care lobbies’ Brussels
offices (see also Greer 2009). In many cases I was able to interview two people in the same
job as these are mostly high-turnover positions. These interviews allowed me to interpret
data from a review of the documented history of a variety of policy initiatives, drawing on
the work of EU legal scholars and policy debates.
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2. Supporting coalitions
Students of courts and policy have often found that the law is not as powerful as it might
seem. The ultimate impact of law or judicial decisions, like guidelines or norms, depends
on the extent to which they enjoy a supporting coalition whose members, especially any
politicians, lower courts, officials, and interest groups, are willing to support them in
legislating, policymaking, budgeting, implementation, lobbying, litigating, and legal
judgments.
2.1. Courts and law
Courts in general have limited ability to impose their preferences. They must wait for
cases to come to them, even in an abstract review setting, and so they depend on litigants
who are willing to bring the cases (and lower courts to refer them). They depend on
others to implement their decisions. They neither manage nor budget. Judges are not
policy experts and implementing legally well-founded decisions can be a challenge in
practice. As a result, courts must interact with politicians, bureaucrats, and litigants if
their decisions are to change policy and its implementation: they must find a supporting
coalition (Rosenberg 1991; Canon & Johnson 1999). The relationship between jurispru-
dence and policy is complex, but courts in general shy away from making decisions that
will not be implemented and often retreat if they face too much political resistance (Epp
2008).
Studies suggest that the specific case of the ECJ fits with these general expectations.
They suggest that its decisions, if they are to have an impact on policy, need to have some
kind of supporting coalition. Member states’ initial response to adverse ECJ rulings is
usually “contained compliance:” they comply with the most minimal interpretation of the
decision (Conant 2002), and many countries ignore decisions made with regard to other
jurisdictions. Only if there is a stream of cases challenging them, and building up juris-
prudence outside their control, will most states start to both implement seriously and
consider EU-level political responses such as legislation or new governance. They might,
at the same time, start to seek EU legislation or other instruments that would allow them
to reassert at least some of their control over the policy framework (Börzel 2006). The
insight that a supporting coalition is necessary to (at a minimum) provide litigants has
underpinned an important strand of work on EU legal development and its impact (Alter
& Vargas 2000; Cichowski 2007), while the best explanation of the rise of EU law has
focused on its attractiveness to member state lower courts, an important part of the
supporting coalition for the ECJ itself (Alter 2001).
Courts are not alone in requiring a supporting coalition in order to effect change.
The literature on Europeanization focuses on legislation and makes the same point:
change in response to EU policy tends not to happen without supporters promoting the
change in the member states (Graziano & Vink 2007). It is not just a simple concept of
“match” or “mismatch” that determines whether member states implement policy to the
satisfaction of the Commission and Court; it is also determined by whether there are
groups seeking to use the EU policy as an opportunity for policy change (Héritier 2001;
Smith 2005).
2.2. Experimentalist governance
The need for a supporting coalition is more obvious in experimentalist governance
because it amounts to little or nothing without the participation of significant actors.
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Newer forms of governance in the EU, such as the OMC, appeared in response to the EU’s
difficulty affecting policies, whether because there were no supportive coalitions for EU
policies or because the constitutional asymmetry of the EU left it with little or no power
to act in important areas (Wincott 2003). We see this in the explicit reasoning of the
White Paper on Governance in the EU (COM(2001)428), which formally introduced a
number of alternative policymaking partnerships and forums into EU governance, and
the conclusions of the 2000 decisions by the Council1 that made health care an official
part of the EU policy apparatus (de la Porte et al. 2002). We also see this in the “pre-
history” of such governance (states comparing plans and performance before such activ-
ity was named and formalized as an EU policy instrument), the long-standing ubiquity of
networks in EU governance (Sabel & Zeitlin 2007), and even suggestions in 2010 that
European states might peer review each others’ draft budgets. The risk is that the relevant
organizations will not join experimentalist mechanisms or will pay only lip service to
their decisions – that their leaders will agree to shared objectives and then do something
else. The reasons they might do something else are numerous: political conflict (Page
2005), broader domestic political priorities, administrative incapacity (Schout et al.
2010), and bureaucratic isolation of the people who attend the international meetings
(Greer 2010).
If they work, such forms of experimentalist governance compensate for constitutional
asymmetry by extending the EU role and EU-wide coordination into areas outside the
core of internal market law and the range of priorities in EU action beyond the four
freedoms, and they compensate for the possibility of overreach by integrating much
broader parts of government as well as, possibly, civil society. Their weakness is that, even
more than the Court, they depend on a supporting coalition: hard law, at least in theory,
demands compliance, while newer forms of governance, if they do nothing to elicit a
supporting coalition, can be ignored by all but a few ministry bureaucrats.
3. Hard law and constitutional asymmetry in European Union health care
services governance
The EU’s constitutional asymmetry has heretofore allowed the ECJ to wield power over
health care in Max Weber’s classic definition of power as the “chance of a man or a
number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of
others” (Weber 1946, p. 180). There is essentially no evidence of economic, political, or
social supporting coalitions behind the ECJ’s move into health care services (Martinsen
2005; Greer 2006; Lamping & Steffen 2009). As with most social policy, there was minimal
demand for integration and member states were reticent about writing it into the treaties
as an EU competency. Nevertheless, the ECJ created the EU competency and developed a
jurisprudence treating health care as a service. Neither EU legislative politics nor events
in most member states, though, show a supporting coalition to implement or further its
jurisprudence.
3.1. Status quo ante: Social security coordination and treaties
There was not much demand for new patient mobility law because there was an existing
regime that incorporated most organized actors in health care. EU patient mobility policy
began in 1959 (with Regulation 3, one of the first EU laws) and took its current form with
Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004. Under social security law (which produced the Euro-
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pean health insurance card [EHIC]), citizens of EU member states have a right to
emergency treatment abroad, which is reimbursed by their member state. They can only
have publicly financed nonemergency health care outside their member state of residence
if their home (paying) member state “pre-authorizes” it. Furthermore, much cross-
border patient mobility takes place in clearly identifiable border regions such as the
Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Benelux (Rosenmöller et al. 2006). In many cases the member
states and regional governments involved have treaties and associated agreements. These
are pragmatic, tailored to local situations, and could, legally, exist without the EU. Like-
wise, UK National Health Service (NHS) decisions around 2000–2001 to send patients
abroad for care did not draw on specific EU health law; they simply involved contracts
between the UK Department of Health and particular French and Belgian providers (four
interviews, UK Department of Health, 2004–2009; also Glinos et al. 2010b).
3.2. Freedom to provide services
The ECJ took a different approach from 1998 when it made the important Kohll (1998)
and Decker (1998) decisions. Substantively, it ruled that EU citizens could be reimbursed
by their home countries for health care services purchased in different countries on the
grounds that limiting reimbursement to services purchased at home interferes with the
freedom of movement of services. These decisions applied the law on the internal market,
specifically the freedom to provide services stated at the time in Article 49 of the Treaties,
to health care (when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, Article 49 became Article 56). The
shift in legal approach is important because it meant that at least some health care
services were subject to at least some EU internal market law. The logic of the two
decisions meant that even if eligibility for social security financing remained a matter for
member states under social security law, the member states were interfering with the right
to provide services if they kept their citizens from using their public social security
benefits to purchase health care services in other member states.
The ECJ went on to develop a quite full jurisprudence, one that gradually extended
the scope of internal market law in health care from the initial marginal cases (of
spectacles and orthodontia in reimbursement systems) to the full range of non-hospital
and some hospital care anywhere in the EU. Defining “hospital” and “non-hospital” care
has been a considerable challenge for policymakers and lawyers because it seems there is
little or no consistency about the meaning of hospitals or what kinds of care take place in
them across Europe (interviews, European Health Management Association, London,
May 2004; European Commission, Gastein, October 2009). The ECJ and its Auditors-
General (who draft opinions) also experimented with a variety of other legal principles
that would help it identify discrimination, including the possibility that there was such a
thing as an unreasonable waiting time (in the Auditor-General’s report for Watts2 (2005))
and the possibility that member states should have to use “European” criteria in deciding
what to cover (in the ECJ’s decision in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms3 (2001)). The ECJ
drew back: it opted not to decide on the legitimacy of or criteria for appropriate waiting
lists in Watts (2005). It also refrained from repeating its demand for “European” standards
since Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms (2001).
By 2006, the ECJ had made it clear that internal market law applies to health care
subject to balancing demands for public health and the financial stability of health care
systems (Hervey & Vanhercke 2010). Such balancing raises at least two questions. To what
extent would a range of EU internal market laws covering issues such as competition,
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state aids to enterprise, and public procurement turn out to apply to health? And, what
would balancing mean: What kinds of organizations in a given country would be able to
claim what kinds of exemptions from what aspects of internal market law?
These were big questions to have open. Potentially, huge areas of internal market law
could apply, opening up much of health care to private sector competition, undermining
a variety of risk-pooling arrangements and imposing transaction costs. Health ministry
interviewees in Britain, France, and Germany all spoke (in 2006, 2009, and 2007 inter-
views) of the alarming results of the in-house impact analyses they conducted. Academic
and policy analyses identified interpretations that would be costly and might require
major structural reforms (Busse et al. 2002; McKee et al. 2002a,b). These questions led
member states to ask the Commission for a legislative proposal. Legislation would start to
answer those questions by fixing health care as a kind of service with a particular
insertion into internal market law, and the legislative process that would give member
states and elected politicians the input that they did not have into the Court’s decisions.
The Commission’s first legislative response was to incorporate health care services
into its 2004 proposal for a Services Directive intended to liberalize a range of services
across Europe. This proposal, which codified and in many ways went beyond the most
liberal of the Court’s rulings, produced a backlash in general (Crespy 2010) and in health
care (Greer 2009; Jarman & Greer 2010). When it passed the European Parliament,
amendments included removal of health care from its remit.
3.3. Freedom of movement of people
After the failure to include health care in the Services Directive, the EU was left with a
badly stitched legal “patchwork” (Hervey & Vanhercke 2010). Social security coordina-
tion, treaties, and cross-border agreements all remained intact. Patient mobility based
on the freedom to provide services remained entrenched in ECJ decisions even if it had
failed in legislation. With little additional debate the Parliament and Council called for
the Commission to bring forth a proposal for legislation that would be specific to the
health care sector and balance markets with regulation and integration with subsidiarity
in a way suited to health care (see COM(2008)414:2). The Council, under the UK 2006
Presidency, spelled out its preferences: universality, equity, solidarity, and the autonomy
of member states.4 These values were meant as a rebuke to the Commission and a
reminder of the values member states felt were left out of the Court rulings and Com-
mission proposals to date (interviews, UK and German governments, October 2006).
The problem for policymakers was to find a legal basis for a policy that would fit with
the existing decisions without making health care a service and that would allow more
presumptively popular patient focus without relying on the EU’s very weak formal
competencies over health care services. The Commission prepared a draft that included
extensive discussions of patient safety, redress, and information as well as other mecha-
nisms that would make it more patient-friendly. This is the proposed Directive on
cross-border patient mobility (COM(2008)414). The “recitals,” the important prelimi-
nary declarations that are guidance as to legislative intent, emphasized free movement of
people rather than commerce in health care services. It would allow member states to
require pre-authorization for “hospital” care, defined as expensive and high-technology
care. A patient from a poor country who sought treatment under the Directive in a rich
country would have to pay all travel and care costs out of pocket and then be reimbursed
at the much lower tariff of his or her home state.5
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The Directive passed the European Parliament in 2009 but not the Council. Many
member states in the Council opposed the whole concept of EU health care services law.
Interviewees, from, for example, the health ministries and permanent representations of
the UK, Germany, and then-President Sweden, argued to me in late 2009 that it was
necessary to pass EU legislation precisely in order to control the Court and prevent it
further assimilating health care services to the freedom to provider services. The Directive
finally passed the Council in January 2010.
3.4. Reactions to EU health care law and supporting coalitions
There are two notable aspects of the story. The Court exercised a quite pure form of
power, extending EU competencies and incorporating health care into the internal
market despite a general lack of demand for such law and only the (literally) weakest of
allies – sick individuals. The member states and Commission found it difficult to respond.
This story is compatible with the constitutional asymmetry of the EU.
But the effects on EU health systems were rather less dramatic than the legal prin-
ciples might have predicted. Research is starting to emerge on the effects of the health
decisions on different member states (Martinsen & Vrangbaek 2008; Martinsen & Blom-
qvist 2009; Obermaier 2009; Baeten et al. 2010; Glinos et al. 2010a,b; Wismar et al. 2010;
Greer & Rauscher 2011a,b). Broadly, this research finds variable but often minimal
responses by health policymakers and health systems, consonant with Conant’s “con-
tained compliance” thesis (2002). There are only glimpses of what might be, or become,
a supporting coalition in member states for the developing regulatory framework of EU
health care services law – the supporting coalition that the literature suggests further
policy change requires. Conceptually, the coalition is made up of groups who would
benefit from a stronger EU competency. Support for stronger EU health care policies can
be for one of two reasons.
First, it could be out of a desire to engage in cross-border arbitrage – to actually
compete for patients across borders. Cross-border health care is a small market: many
estimates put it at around 1–2% (Carrera & Lunt 2010), with one interviewee (an
executive for a major health insurer, interviewed in June 2010) putting the most opti-
mistic estimate for the market at 4% of European patients. Most such patients are
concentrated in border regions or a few particularly attractive areas for retirement or
second homes (Spanish coasts, London). Cost, the single biggest driver of international
patient mobility, is less of a problem in the EU’s universal coverage systems (Jarman et al.
2010; Laugesen & Vargas-Bustamente 2010).
Second, a supporting coalition could be interested in exploiting the regulatory desta-
bilization inherent in developing EU law. EU law regulates states’ policy decisions, poten-
tially making policy tools that depend on territorial closure unusable. This means that EU
law offers another means of effecting domestic policy change. For example, rationing by
waiting becomes a less useful policy tool insofar as EU law permits patients to go abroad
for care and then seek reimbursement. Purely legal analyses suggest that such risks to
closure exist and that EU legal principles could be used to remove important regulations
(Hatzopoulos 2010). There have also been cases in which incumbent private firms used
EU public procurement and state aid law to challenge policies (van de Gronden 2009),
including two salient health care cases in health care. In the Asklepios (2008) case, a
private German hospital chain objected to what it saw as subsidies to public sector
competitors, while in the BUPA (2008) case an insurer objected to an Irish government
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decision to make it subsidize a public insurance pool. In both cases, however, the decision
of the EU courts amounted to an affirmation of the autonomy of health care systems.6 In
a characteristic EU judicial solution, the Court ruled that the member states must have
clear and transparent rules for deciding such issues, switching responsibility to states and
their procedures.
The cases since 2006 have been brought by individual patients trying to improve their
social rights through EU law. For example, in the recent Elchinov (2010) case, a Bulgarian
man argued that Bulgaria had granted him a right to the “best available treatment,” and
the best available treatment was available not in Bulgaria, but in Germany (where, of
course, it cost far more) (Sokol forthcoming). The list of cases is essentially a list of
names, each name a patient who sought mobility as a way to get better health care, and
the stories rarely show organized interests behind them. The effect of this kind of case has
been that the ECJ is presented with opportunities to decide what rules health services
must use in determining eligibility for treatment. This might be a blow for expanded
social rights, but from the perspective of, for example, financially constrained Bulgarian
health managers, it is a serious problem.
4. New governance
It is not surprising that the development of hard, destabilizing law on health care services
sparked the development of alternative experimentalist governance frameworks. The
Court’s rulings and logic left it relatively exposed, with much more opposition among
incumbents than support. The European Commission, meanwhile, is very well suited to
developing and presenting policy alternatives. Not only is it an entrepreneurial organi-
zation with a long record of developing ideas for EU initiatives of all sorts (Shore 2007;
Cram 2009), it is also a fragmented organization with many departments (Directorates-
General [DGs]) of different orientations. These compete for influence in different policy
fields, and so the effect of the ECJ rulings was to spur a variety of DGs to propose different
health care policies (Greer 2008). DG Internal Market’s proposal was the Services Direc-
tive, and DG Health and Consumer Protection (a.k.a. DG Sanco) is responsible for the
Directive on cross-border patient mobility. But parts of the Commission also suggest
experimentalist governance frameworks that might win supporting coalitions.
Two experimentalist frameworks have particularly strong institutional support
within the Commission and might satisfy that holder of destabilization rights as well as
incumbent health care services players: the OMC (run by DG Employment, Social Affairs
and Equal Opportunities, a.k.a. DG EMPL) and a range of special groups run by DG
Sanco. They are ringed by other committees, groups, and platforms working in EU health
policy, most of which either are high-level committees with no specific powers or role in
policy change or are focused on public health and not the focus of this article (Jarman
forthcoming).
In each case they arose and gained momentum in response to the threat that health
care services would be simply assimilated to internal market law. While their creation was
usually due to a variety of motivations – Commission entrepreneurialism, interest group
or professional interest, member state pressure – they also are ways to “recapture” health
care services from the Court and internal market law. If nothing else, they allow health
services policymakers to talk about issues such as quality and cost of health care, rather
than internal market laws.
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4.1. The Open Method of Coordination
The OMC is a peer-review process for a wide range of social policies, including health
policy. The basic format is the same in each policy area and is the subject of a more than
adequate amount of academic literature (Wincott 2003; Zeitlin 2005; Hatzopoulos 2007
has an extensive bibliography). Sophisticated analysts of the EU’s “destructuring . . .
deterritorializing” impact on welfare states put much hope in the OMC as a mechanism
to reinforce Europe’s social obligations (Ferrera 2005).
Member states agree on a basic set of objectives and indicators of desirable outcomes.
They then produce national action plans on what they are planning to do and reports on
their achievements. The Commission (DG EMPL) and the other member state represen-
tatives discuss and feed the member state’s data into a Joint Report commenting on its
progress. In many cases the member state’s report and the Joint Report are quite similar.
There is a running debate about the effects of the OMC that is not just academic:
Since I was specifically asked to address it, I will take a minute to talk about the
OMC. Is this being recorded? Yes? All of it? Let me phrase this carefully then. I
have been told . . . I have heard . . . what is that? Did somebody say it doesn’t work?
(DG Sanco official, 2 October 2009)
Obvious bureaucratic rivalry means we should expect that a DG Sanco official would
denigrate DG EMPL’s signature health policy tool, especially in 2008–2009 when DG
EMPL was openly leaking information detrimental to the patient mobility Directive in
the hopes that it would fail and health care services would be folded back into social
security law. Such “downright infighting,” as one member state official called it in an
interview, is common in the Commission. Likewise, it should not be too surprising that
a little-known exercise conducted at the official level has failed to change policies in many
member states. This quotation is from the Commission’s own 2008 assessment of the
impact of the OMC:
Delivery on the common objectives has been too slow or insufficient . . . there is a
widespread consensus that the potential of the Social OMC remains largely unex-
ploited, that a number of weaknesses should be corrected and that strategic rein-
forcement of the method would go some way towards improving delivery on the
common objectives. The analysis points to a lack of political commitment and
visibility and a need for better horizontal policy coordination and mainstreaming
of social protection and social inclusion concerns in all relevant policy areas.
(SEC(2008)2170: 2)
That kind of review obscures a larger point. The OMC, like many political institu-
tions, is not a single-purpose instrument (Zeitlin 2005), and it can do many things that
gain supporters (Greer & Vanhercke 2010). Some of its uses are clear. It is an opportunity
for the relevant health ministry officials to learn from each other without the costs of
organizing separate conferences. It might help socialize health ministry officials into a
more “European” way of working. It is an agenda-setting mechanism (one of a great
many) in that it draws attention to member states’ performance on specific indicators. It
justifies applying for EU funds (European Social Fund) to remedy deficiencies. It prob-
ably strengthens some campaigns that were gaining attention anyway, such as Europe-
wide interest in health inequalities. It might strengthen the EU’s social policy thinking
and legitimate social democratic concerns in a political system with a strong neoliberal
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bias and tight fiscal policies. Each of these uses could, potentially, contribute to a sup-
porting coalition among health ministries and perhaps line health officials concerned
with health outcomes who find that the OMC is useful as a normative reference or as a
guide. So far, it is not at all clear that such a development is taking place in health; rather,
member state health ministry officials spoke of the OMC as a bureaucratic burden
(interviews in UK and Germany, October 2009; France, November 2009).
4.2. Health sector initiatives in health care services
A second kind of experimentalist EU governance is more specific, better defined, con-
nected with existing professional groups or interests, and found in relatively marginal
areas that lack the high costs and high politics of health care services. The same DG Sanco
official who was unimpressed with the OMC argued for targeted programs such as
cooperation on rare diseases. He quoted Everett Rogers’ analysis of the diffusion of
innovations, which argues that innovations transfer when possible adopters view them as
relatively better than the status quo, compatible with values and other practices, of
manageable complexity, trialable so that they can be abandoned if they do not work, and
have observable results (October 2009) (Rogers 2003).
His nomination for an effective health program, and a good example of the logic, was
the rare diseases action that was just starting. Rare diseases in the EU definition affect a
maximum of five per 10,000 people; most countries have only a handful of sufferers of
most rare diseases, and so the case for EU action is not hard to make. This program began
with a 1999 decision to set up a Europe-wide network as part of the overall EU public
health framework (Decision 1295/1999/EC). The network set to developing potential EU
actions as well as a newsletter, Internet portal, and large conferences.
The potential supportive coalition for rare diseases policy is visible. Pharmaceutical
interests, which are very powerful in the EU and often shape its health agenda (Carboni
2009), support it. Patient and disease focused groups, many of which work very closely
with pharmaceutical firms, can be supportive. Doctors and researchers in rare diseases,
and their sponsors in health systems, might be supportive. It is not hard to see why parts
of the Commission might see an opportunity to provide an EU service that would have
a supporting coalition, and the rare diseases issue has the added benefits of sympathetic
sufferers and economies of scale. The opposition mostly came from big member states
such as Germany that felt they could run good networks internally, without Commission
help. Once it was agreed that the networks could exist within a single member state (e.g.
Germany), the Council could in June 2009 endorse networks and a coordinating com-
mittee (Recommendation 2009/C 151/02) and the Commission made its implementing
decision in November 2009 (C2009(9181)).
This activity, a nice example of Commission entrepreneurialism and EU networking
in its own right, sparked activities far in advance of the legal requirements of 2009.
Activists interested in particular diseases started to connect through the EU network, and
member state health ministries either began to collect information about rare disease
incidence and treatment or delegated its collection to others such as medical societies.
The work was not necessarily hard, but it created a large amount of information and new
networks that had not been present in many countries (e.g. for many diseases there was
no Austrian guide to treatment or resources, leaving doctors to find diagnostic and
treatment initiatives by word of mouth; the Austrian Medical Society delegated members
to coordinate and develop the information in late 2008; interview, Austrian Medical
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Society, October 2009). The EU activity acted as a spur to collect information, and now
that there is a larger and more sophisticated EU policy machine it might impel member
states to use the new, comparable information about resources to improve or coordinate
their resources. While there is no EU requirement beyond participation in the network
(the legislative instrument, a Recommendation, is very weak), there seems to be an
element of competition between member states to provide better treatment. Professional
and national pride is a major driver of participation in such networks (Briatte 2010).
The new rare diseases network is one of a number of cases of very specific EU
initiatives. There are other cases in which networks have developed to pursue goals. They
include blood safety, where EU law obliged member states to create responsible authorities
that relied heavily on and strengthened pre-existing networks (Faber 2004; Farrell 2005),
cancer research and networking (Trubek et al. 2008), organ donation, communicable
disease control (Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 2012 36(1)), obesity policy
(Jarman 2011), and HIV/AIDS data (Steffen forthcoming). There are also examples
outside health in areas such as utility, financial, and telecommunications regulation. In
each case, the EU has provided resources and legitimacy for activists who wish to exchange
information and increase their ability to pressure their member states. The appeal is to
small groups, such as rare diseases or blood specialists – latent networks that can be
organized to pool resources, compete, and point to each other’s EU-validated work to
pressure their member state governments.
In principle, this kind of more specific sectoral initiative can surmount the three
obvious problems of the OMC in health: its broad system-level focus, the tendency for
OMC work to concentrate in health ministries’ international rather than line divisions,
and the ease with which comparative health indicators can always be discredited. By
drawing on smaller networks with clearer preferences, more specific data concerns,
greater lobby support, and professional engagement, it can create coordination and
rulemaking where there were only informal shared ideas. But success at the task that
interests them, be it rare diseases treatment, cancer research, or blood safety, does not
mean that such networks will influence the development of the overall EU policy frame-
work. Their meliorism could coexist with many different EU policies. Nor is the judg-
ment of success definitive: even in cancer and communicable diseases, where the
networks have long existed and led to the creation of a well-established cancer research
network and an EU communicable disease agency, respectively, the actual effects are
difficult to determine.
5. Conclusion: Appearances and the unexpected
Constitutional asymmetry is an important part of the EU policy story, but it is not the
only part. Health care services policy in the EU has been, so far, driven by supranational
political institutions. This means preliminary reference decisions by the ECJ followed by
diverse Commission initiatives. There has been little visible demand for the policy, and
efforts to legislate the policy have been rebuffed so far, but that has been no impediment
to the creation of EU powers, application of the four freedoms, and obligatory changes to
member state laws. It is no wonder that such a system has been gradually redefining law
and politics across Europe (Kelemen 2010).
But there is a problem with exercising power from above. Policymaking with little or
no supporting coalition is a good (literally, textbook Weberian) demonstration of power
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but it is not a route to effective implementation. Implementation of judicial decisions, let
alone their conversion into a set of policies and principles with wide application, depends
on bureaucrats and individuals who change what they are doing – who comply with
decisions or who litigate against the non-compliant. Compliance is so far highly variable,
and consequential changes in patient or market behavior have not been clear in the
few studies done so far. Even with the support and engagement of some member state
courts, there are limits to what the ECJ, or any top court, can do to change policy if the
supporting coalitions are weak.
Against that backdrop, of the unexpected weakness of apparently strong policy, we
might also notice the unexpected strength of apparently weak policy. If the common
denominator of effective policies is a supporting coalition, then experimentalist gover-
nance mechanisms with supporting coalitions can have more desired effects than court
cases or even laws that lack such supporting coalitions.
Reading the history of EU health care services policy to date, the story is of consti-
tutional asymmetry, with the EU institutions and a very few allies in the member states
able to create competencies where none were desired and to apply the law of the four
freedoms without much attention to competing priorities or policy complexity. It means
that there has been abundant reason to view the EU as a basically liberalizing force that
cannot muster sufficient positive integration to preserve solidarity and financial stability
in health. But the ECJ’s power, shown in its health care jurisprudence, is vulnerable to
implementation failure, and the judges might lose interest if they run short of new cases
or opportunities to make workable decisions. Law alone, without a supporting coalition,
is not as effective as it might seem on paper, while network-based experimentalist gov-
ernance need not be as ineffective as it might look.
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Notes
1 All the relevant documents are available on the PRELEX page for the Directive, http://
ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=197193, [Last accessed 14 March
2011].
2 Case C-372/04 Watts; compare the opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, delivered on 15
December 2005.
3 Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms. The reference to the need for broader criteria than
the member state is in paragraphs 94–96.
4 Council declaration 2006/C146/01.
5 See 2008/0142 (COD), Council note of 26 November 2009, paragraphs 21–24, for states’
concern about this point.
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6 As has taken place with other services: pharmacy C-22/2001 Doc Morris (2003), and ambulance
services C-475/99 Ambulanz Gloeckner (2001), where the underlying legal principle could have




C-120/95 (1998) Nicolas Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privé.
C-157/99 (2001) B.S.M. Geraets-Smits and Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and between H.T.M.
Peerbooms and Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen.
C-158/96 (1998) Raymond Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie.
C-173/09 (2010) Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v Natsionalna zdravnoosiguritelna kasa.
C-322/01 (2003) Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval.
C-372/04 (2005) Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health.
C-475/99 (2001) Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz.
Court of First Instance
C-199/58 (2007) Asklepios Kliniken GmbH v Commission of the European Communities.
C-79/48 (2008) BUPA and others v. Commission.
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